WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Fluor Corporation v. Jet Stream Enterprises Limited

Case No. D2010-0395

1. The Parties

The Complainant is Fluor Corporation, of Irving, Texas, United States of America, represented by Melbourne IT DBS Inc., United States of America.

The Respondent is Jet Stream Enterprises Limited, St Johns, Antigua and Barbuda.

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name is <flourdaniel.com>. It is registered with eNom, Inc. (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

According to information provided by the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”), the history of this proceeding is as follows:

- The Complaint was filed with the Center on March 13, 2010.

- On March 15, 2010, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name.

- On March 15, 2010, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details.

- The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

- In accordance with Rules paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), on March 23, 2010 the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings were commenced.

- In accordance with Rules paragraph 5(a), the due date for the Respondent to submit its Response was April 11, 2010. The Respondent did not submit any Response.

- On April 15, 2010, the Center formally notified the parties that the Respondent was in default because it failed to submit a Response, and that the proceeding would continue with a single-member Administrative Panel.

- On April 28, 2010, the Center appointed Bradley Freedman as the sole panelist in this matter. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with Rules paragraph 7.

Based upon the information provided by the Center, the Panel finds that it was properly constituted in accordance with the Rules and the Supplementary Rules, and that all technical requirements for this proceeding have been met.

4. Factual Background

The following information is derived from the Complaint and supporting evidence submitted by the Complainant:

- The Complainant is the largest U.S.-based, publicly-traded engineering, procurement, construction, maintenance services, and project management company. The Complainant is a FORTUNE 150 company. It has a global workforce of over 40,000 people, with offices or projects in more than 66 countries on six continents. The Complainant's subsidiary corporations include Fluor Daniel International Services Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of Barbados.

- The Complainant, directly and through its subsidiary corporations, develops and implements innovative solutions for complex capital projects for diverse clients and industries, including chemicals and petrochemicals, commercial and institutional, government services, life sciences, manufacturing, mining, oil and gas, power, renewable energy, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure. Those projects include the design and construction of refineries, pipelines, mining operations, wind farms, bridges, and factories.

- Specific to the Caribbean region, where the Respondent has its offices, the Complainant and its subsidiary corporations have performed more than 660 projects since 1992, including projects in the American Virgin Islands, Belize, the Cayman Islands, Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico.

- The Complainant is the owner of the trademark FLUOR, registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office effective June 15, 1954 (registration no. 0591442) for use in association with various construction services.

- The Complainant is the owner of the trademark FLUOR DANIEL, which the complainant commenced using as early as January 1988. The FLUOR DANIEL trademark is registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office effective June 5, 2001 (registration no. 2,456,881) for use in association various construction, maintenance, repair, architectural and engineering services. The FLUOR DANIEL trademark is also registered as a Community Trademark effective January 15, 2001 (registration no. 001408863) for use in association with Nice Classifications 37 (custom construction services), 40 (gas-related services), and 42 (engineering and design services).

- In addition, the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark is reflected in the domain name <fluordaniel.com>, which the Complainant has owned since February 1, 1996.

- The disputed domain name was registered on August 24, 2000.

- The Respondent uses the disputed domain name for a website that provides links to various third party websites, including websites of the Complainant's competitors and websites that provide information regarding engineering jobs, as well as advertisements for unrelated products and services.

- There is no relationship between the Complainant and the Respondent. The Respondent is not a licensee or authorized representative of the Complainant.

- The Respondent does not use words “Flour Daniel” as a trademark or otherwise, except in connection with the disputed domain name.

- The Complainant sent cease and desist demand letters dated January 19 and 26, 2010 to the Respondent. The Respondent did not reply to those letters.

Information provided by the Center indicates as follows:

- After the Complainant delivered the Complaint to the Respondent, the Respondent sent an email dated March 18, 2010 to the Complainant requesting that this proceeding be suspended and stating, in part, as follows:

“We want to state that we do not wish to dispute the domain but rather have it transferred to you as soon as possible”.

- The Respondent has not filed a Response to the Complaint or answered the Complainant's factual assertions or evidence in any other manner.

On its own initiative, the Panel accessed the website using the disputed domain name. (This practice has been adopted by numerous panels: see Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. David Sallen, Sallen Enterprises, and J. D. Sallen Enterprises,WIPO Case No. D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000); Commonwealth Hotels Inc. v. CCD Internet, Case No. AF-00771 (May 17, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. d/b/a Ad Here and TOTALLYFREESTUFF.COM v. John Zuccarini d/b/a Cupcake Patrol, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001); and The Vanguard Group, Inc. v. Lorna Kang, WIPO Case No. D2002-1064 (January 20, 2003) The links on the website appear to be provided by commercial Internet advertising services operated by Doubleclick.com and Overture.

5. Parties' Contentions

A. Complainant

The Complainant contends as follows:

(i) The Complainant is the owner of the FLUOR DANIEL trademark, and the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark.

(ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name.

(iii) The Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith because the Respondent registered the domain name to divert Internet users to other websites for commercial gain.

B. Respondent

The Respondent has not filed a Response to the Complaint or answered the Complainant's contentions in any other manner.

6. Discussion and Findings

The Policy is narrow in scope. It applies only to disputes involving alleged bad faith registration and use of domain names – conduct commonly known as “cybersquatting” or “cyberpiracy”. The Policy does not apply to other kinds of disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. The narrow scope of the Policy reflects its origin as a novel form of dispute resolution designed to balance a wide range of perspectives regarding the regulation of Internet conduct.

The application of the Policy is limited to situations in which a complainant asserts and proves the following requirements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a): (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. The burden is on a complainant to prove all three required elements in order to be entitled to relief under the Policy. It is not sufficient for a complainant to make assertions without providing proof.

(i) The Respondent's Default

Rules paragraph 10(a) requires that the Panel ensure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case. Rules paragraph 14 reads as follows:

Default

(a) In the event that a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any of the time periods established by these Rules or the Panel, the Panel shall proceed to a decision on the complaint.

(b) If a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any provision of, or requirement under, these Rules or any request from the Panel, the Panel shall draw such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate.

The Respondent was given notice of this proceeding in accordance with the Rules. The Center discharged its responsibility under Rules paragraph 2(a) to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to the Respondent of the Complaint.

The Respondent's email correspondence with the Complainant implicitly acknowledges receipt of the copy of the Complaint delivered by the Complainant.

In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Respondent has been given a fair opportunity to answer the Complaint, and the Panel will proceed to a decision.

The Respondent's default does not automatically result in a decision in favor of the Complainant. The Complainant must still prove each of the three elements required by Policy paragraph 4(a). Rules paragraph 15(a) provides that the Panel shall decide the Complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, the Rules, and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable. In accordance with Rules paragraph 14(b), the Panel may draw such inferences as are appropriate from the Respondent's failure to reply to the Complainant's assertions and evidence or to otherwise contest the Complaint. In the circumstances, the Panel's decision is based upon the Complainant's assertions and evidence and inferences drawn from the Respondent's failure to reply, as set forth in this decision.

(ii) Identical or Confusingly Similar

The Complainant is the owner of the trademarks FLUOR and FLUOR DANIEL, both registered for use in association with various services, relating to the construction, maintenance, and repair on a custom basis of various buildings, structures and facilities, and uses those marks in association with the advertising of its business, including through a website using the domain name <fluordaniel.com>. The Complainant asserts that it has used the FLUOR trademark since 1954 and the FLUOR DANIEL trademark since December 2001. The Complainant's assertions in this regard are supported by documentary evidence. The Respondent has not contested the Complainant's assertions. In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the trademarks FLUOR and FLUOR DANIEL.

The Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark was registered after the Respondent registered the disputed domain name on August 24, 2000. However, the Policy does not require that a complainant's trademark rights be based upon a registered trademark, or that the complainant's trademark be registered before the domain name. The fact that a disputed domain name predates a complainant's trademark registration may be relevant to the assessment of bad faith pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii), which is considered below. See Uniroyal Engineered Products, Inc. v. Nauga Network Services, WIPO Case No. D2000-0503 (July 18, 2000); AB Svenska Spel v. Andrey Zacharov, WIPO Case No. D2003-0527 (October 2, 2003); Madrid 2012, S.A. v. Scott Martin-MadridMan Websites, WIPO Case No. D2003-0598 (October 8, 2003); Australian Trade Commission v. Matthew Reader, WIPO Case No. D2002-0786 (November 12, 2002); and Imperial College v. Christophe Dessimoz, WIPO Case No. D2004-0322 (June 30, 2004).

In addition, the Complainant has used the FLUOR DANIEL trademark since 1988, over ten years before the Respondent registered the disputed domain name. The Complainant's long-term use of the FLUOR DANIEL trademark is sufficient to establish that the FLUOR DANIEL trademark had become a distinctive identifier of the Complainant and its services prior to the date when the disputed domain name was registered.

The Policy requires that the disputed domain name be “identical or confusingly similar” to the Complainant's trademarks. Neither the Policy nor the Rules provide any guidance with respect to the test to be applied regarding the confusing similarity requirement of the Policy. Nevertheless, the consensus reflected in the decisions is that the appropriate test for confusing similarity is a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the complainant's trademark. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, section 1.1.

The literal comparison approach is supported by a number of considerations, which have been discussed in various decisions. See: Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Limited v. Dejan Macesic, WIPO Case No. D2000-1698 (January 25, 2001); Consitex S.A., Lanificio Ermenegildo Zegna & Figli S.p.A., Ermenegildo Zegna Corporation v. Ms. Patricia Chung, WIPO Case No. D2004-0490 (August 27, 2004); Pancil, LLC v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2007-0492 (May 31, 2007) Highlights for Children, Inc. v. Services LLC, WIPO Case No. D2007-0337 (May 28, 2007); and Scania CV AB (Publ) v. ScaniaFinance.co.uk, WIPO Case No. D2008-0113 (March 14, 2008).

For those reasons, the Panel considers the appropriate test for confusing similarity to be a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the Complainant's trademark.

The disputed domain name and the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark are visually and phonetically similar. The only differences between the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark and the disputed domain name is the reversed order of the letters “u” and “o” (changing “Fluor” to “Flour”), the “.com” suffix, and the omission of a space between the words FLUOR and DANIEL.

The disputed domain name appears to be a purposeful misspelling of the FLUOR DANIEL trademark. It appears that the Respondent is engaged in a practice known as “typosquatting” – where a domain name is a slight variation from a well-known mark in order to divert Internet traffic. This practice takes advantage of Internet users inadvertently typing an incorrect address when seeking to access the trademark owner's website. Typosquatters often profit by selling advertisements and links to websites operated by the trademark owner's competitors.

Many panels have held that domain names based on a misspelling of trademarks are confusingly similar. For example, see Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft v. New York TV Tickets Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-1314 (February 12, 2002); The Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. v. NSDAQ.COM, NASDQ.COM and NASAQ.COM, WIPO Case No. D2001-1492; Wachovia Corporation v. Carrington, WIPO Case No. D2002-0775 (October 2, 2002); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Steven Newman a/k/a Jill Wasserstein a/k/a Pluto Newman, WIPO Case No. D2006-0517 (June 28, 2006); Doctor.Ing.h.c. F.Porsche AG v. Stonybrook Investments Limited, WIPO Case No. D2001-1095 (October 26, 2001); Red Bull GmbH v. Grey Design, WIPO Case No. D2001-1035 (October 24, 2001); Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Limited v. Macesic, WIPO Case No. D2000-1698 (January 25, 2001); Bang & Olufsen a/s v. Unasi Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0728 (September 7, 2005); EasyGroup IP Licensing Limited v. Sansone, WIPO Case No. D2004-0763 (November 16, 2004); and Amazon.com, Inc. v. Steven Newman a/k/a Jill Wasserstein a/k/a Pluto Newman , WIPO Case No. D2006-0517 (June 28, 2006).

The “.com” suffix is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether a challenged domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. Rather, one looks to the second level domain for such a determination, since the “.com” suffix is merely descriptive of the registry services. Similarly, the omission of spaces between components of a trademark, or the omission of design elements used in a domain name (which is a function of the technological limitations of the Internet domain name system), should be disregarded when determining whether the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark. See The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Karpachev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571 (January 15, 2001); Ticketmaster Corporation v. Harold R. Brown, II, Harold R. Brown III, and Ted Waitt, WIPO Case No. D2001-0716 (July 18, 2001); The Chancellor, Masers and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. DR Seagle t/a Mr. Oxford-University, WIPO Case No. D2001-0746 (August 14, 2001); Pancil, LLC v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2007-0492 (May 31, 2007); Highlights for Children, Inc. v. Services LLC, WIPO Case No. D2007-0337 (May 28, 2007); and Scania CV AB (Publ) v. ScaniaFinance.co.uk, WIPO Case No. D2008-0113 (March 14, 2008).

In addition, in light of the foregoing and in the absence of any explanation or rationale put forward by the Respondent for its registration and use of the disputed domain name, the Panel finds that the domain name was intended by the Respondent to be confusingly similar to the Complainant's HIGHLIGHTS trademark.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the first element required by the Policy.

(iii) Rights and Legitimate Interests

The second element required by Policy paragraph 4(a) – the registrant has no rights or legitimate interest in the domain name – requires a complainant to prove a negative proposition, which can be particularly difficult. The consensus reflected in the decisions is that the burden of proof on a complainant regarding this element is necessarily light, because the nature of the registrant's rights or legitimate interests, if any, in a domain name lies most directly within the registrant's knowledge. As a practical matter, once a complainant makes a prima facie showing that a registrant does not have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, the evidentiary burden shifts to the registrant to rebut the showing by providing evidence of its rights or interests in the domain name. See Belupo d.d. v. WACHEM d.o.o., WIPO Case No. D2004-0110 (April 14, 2004); Group Kaitu, LLC , Darkside Productions, Inc. v. Group Kaitu LLC aka Manila Industries, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-1087 (January 20, 2006); and Alfa Laval AB, Laval Corporate AB v. Caribbean Online International Ltd.(ALFALAVALL-COM-DOM), WIPO Case No. D2007-1893 (February 27, 2008).

The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name because the Respondent does not use the name FLOUR DANIEL as a trademark, trade name, or business identity, and the disputed domain name is used for a website that provides links to third party websites, including websites of the Complainant's competitors and related matters.

Except for the assertions in the signed and certified Complaint, the Complainant has not provided any evidence of trademark searches or other investigations to indicate that the Respondent does not have any interest in any marks that include the term “flour daniel” and is not commonly known as “flour daniel”. In some circumstances, the omission of that evidence might be fatal to a complaint under the Policy. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this dispute, the signed and certified Complaint together with an adverse inference from the Respondent's failure to reply to the Complaint or provide any justification for its registration and use of the disputed domain name, are sufficient to satisfy the Complainant's evidentiary burden.

Even though the Respondent has not filed a Response to the Complaint and has not contested the Complainant's assertions, it is incumbent upon the Panel to consider whether the Respondent's use of the disputed domain name demonstrates rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. According to Policy paragraph 4(c), the following circumstances, if proved, demonstrate a registrant's rights or legitimate interests in a domain name:

(i) the registrant used or demonstrably prepared to use the domain name or a corresponding name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to notice of the dispute;

(ii) the registrant (as an individual, business, or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if it has not acquired trademark rights; or

(iii) the registrant is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the complainant's mark.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(i) is not applicable. To satisfy the requirements of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i), the Respondent's use of the disputed domain name must be in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. In some circumstances, a website providing links to search results or other websites might constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services. In the circumstances of this case, however, the Respondent's use of the disputed domain name is not bona fide within the meaning of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i) because: (a) the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark; (b) there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain name and the Respondent's name or business; and (c) the Respondent does not use the disputed domain name to advertise or sell its own wares and services, but merely to provide links to “sponsored” links to other websites provided by a commercial Internet advertising service. See Wachovia Corporation v. Peter Carrington, WIPO Case No. D2002-0775 (October 2, 2002); and Adobe Systems Incorporated v. Domain OZ, WIPO Case No. D2000-0057 (March 22, 2000).

Policy paragraph 4(c)(ii) is not applicable. The Respondent does not contend, and there is no evidence that, the Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain name or that the disputed domain name is derived from one of Respondent's trademarks or trade names.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(iii) is not applicable.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

(iv) Registered and Used in Bad Faith

Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii) requires the Complainant to prove that the Respondent registered and has used the disputed domain name in bad faith. The language of Policy paragraph 4(b)(iii) is conjunctive and requires that both bad faith registration and bad faith use be proved.

“Bad faith” within the meaning of the Policy is a term of art, and is not intended to apply to distasteful conduct that might constitute bad faith in the ordinary sense of the term. Policy paragraph 4(b) provides that each of the following circumstances are deemed evidence that a registrant has registered and used a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that the registrant has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of its documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) the registrant has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, the registrant has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website or other on-line location by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website or location or of a product or service on its website or location.

The Policy expressly states that those circumstances are non-exclusive.

In order to establish that a registrant registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith, a complainant need only establish one of the four non-exhaustive criteria set forth in Policy paragraph 4(b).

Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv) applies if the Complainant establishes that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain. There is no direct evidence that the Respondent knew of the Complainant or its FLUOR DANIEL trademark, or intended to use the disputed domain name to confuse and divert Internet users. Nevertheless, the Respondent's knowledge and intention may be determined by common sense inferences from circumstantial evidence.

The Panel finds that the Respondent knew of the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark, and registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to the Respondent's website, based upon the following circumstances: (a) the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark is specific to the Complainant in connection with engineering, construction and related services, and has been widely used and advertised for many years; (b) there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain name and the Respondent; (c) the Respondent uses the disputed domain name for a web page that redirects Internet users to third party websites and provides advertising for third party products or services; (d) there is no apparent legitimate justification for the Respondent's registration and use of the disputed domain name; and (e) the Respondent has not denied any knowledge of the Complainant or its trademarks. In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent's failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name for its website.

A domain name is more than a mere Internet address. It often identifies the source or content of an Internet site, and sends a message that the website is owned by, sponsored by, affiliated with, or endorsed by the person with the name, or owning the trademark, reflected in the domain name. Accordingly, there is a material risk that Internet users attempting to use the disputed domain name to find the Complainant's website and accessing the Respondent's website in error will use the links provided on the Respondent's website. This deliberate bait and switch diversion of Internet user's initial interest is a misappropriation of the Complainant's goodwill associated with its FLUOR DANIEL trademark. See Park Place Entertainment Corporation v. Bowno, WIPO Case No. D2001-1410 (January 29, 2001).

The Panel also finds that the Respondent's use of the disputed domain name results in commercial gain to the Respondent, because the domain name resolves to a web page that redirects Internet users to third party websites. It is well known that many websites generate revenue from click-through advertising, by directing traffic to other websites, and other online marketing techniques. Based upon the information apparent from the Respondent's website, and in the absence of any explanation by the Respondent, the Panel finds that the Respondent's website generates revenue for the Respondent in that manner.

The practice of registering domain names based upon misspellings of well-known trademarks for the purpose of diverting users to an unrelated website that generates advertising revenue for the registrant has been described as “classic bad faith”. See Wachovia Corporation v. Peter Carrington, WIPO Case No. D2002-0775 (October 2, 2002) and Amazon.com, Inc. v. Steven Newman a/k/a Jill Wasserstein a/k/a Pluto Newman, WIPO Case No. D2006-0517 (June 28, 2006).

In the circumstances, the Panel finds, pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv), that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain. See EH New Ventures Inc. v. WW Processing, WIPO Case No. D2003-0007 (March 27, 2003).

In the circumstances, the Panel need not consider whether Policy paragraphs 4(b)(i), (ii) or (iii) are applicable, or whether there are other grounds for finding that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

Accordingly, the Panel finds, pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv), that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

7. Decision

The Complainant has established each of the three requirements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a) – the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's FLUOR DANIEL trademark, the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

The Panel orders that the disputed domain name <flourdaniel.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

Bradley Freedman
Sole Panelist

Dated: May 12, 2010