pumarrosa.com

WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Pancil, LLC v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd.

Case No. D2007-0492

1. The Parties

The Complainant is Pancil, LLC, of La Jolla, California, United States of America, represented by Melkonian & Company, Australia.

The Respondent is Wan-Fu China, Ltd., of Nassau, Bahamas.

2. The Disputed Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name is <pumarrosa.com>. It is registered with DomainDoorman, LLC, (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

According to the information provided by the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”), the history of this proceeding is as follows:

- The Complaint was filed with the Center on March 30, 2007.

- On March 30, 2007, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a Request for Registrar Verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On April 2, 2007, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response advising that the Respondent is listed as the registrant of the disputed domain name and providing the registrant contact details for the disputed domain name.

- The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

- In accordance with Rules paragraphs 2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and this proceeding commenced on April 16, 2007. The Center advised the Respondent that the due date for its response was May 6, 2007.

- The Respondent failed to file a Response within the prescribed time limit or at all, and the Center delivered a Notification of Respondent Default to the Respondent on May 8, 2007.

- The Center appointed Bradley J. Freedman as the sole Panelist in this proceeding on May 21, 2007. The Panelist submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with Rules paragraph 7.

The Panel finds that it was properly constituted and appointed in accordance with the Rules and the Supplemental Rules.

Based upon the information provided by the Center, the Panel finds that all technical requirements for this proceeding have been met.

4. Factual Background

The following information is derived from the Complaint and supporting evidence submitted by the Complainant:

The Complainant is the owner of the trademark PUMAROSA, which means “pink cat” in Spanish. The PUMAROSA trademark has been registered in Argentina, the Benelux, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Germany, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela, and is the subject of numerous pending registrations throughout the world. The PUMAROSA trademark was registered in Canada on June 14, 2006, under number TMA666,048. The PUMAROSA trademark is registered for use in association with education and training services.

The Complainant uses the PUMAROSA trademark in association with its instructional and teaching materials regarding the Spanish language, which are delivered online to students and educators via a website using the domain name <pumarosa.com>. The Complainant has invested hundreds of thousands of dollars annually to establish and maintain its website.

The disputed domain name was registered on February 17, 2007; after the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark was registered in Canada.

The disputed domain name resolves to a website that provides “sponsored” links to third party websites that provide online education and training, including education regarding various languages such as Spanish, French, and German. The website also provides a list of “related categories” regarding online education and learning, which in turn provide additional links to third party websites regarding those topics. Many of the third party websites are owned or operated by the Complainant’s competitors.

There is no relationship between the Complainant and the Respondent. The Respondent does not appear to use the mark “Pumarrosa” except in connection with the disputed domain name. Trademark searches conducted by the Complainant do not reveal any applications or registrations for that mark by the Respondent.

The Respondent has engaged in similar conduct in respect of the domain name <starfalll.org>, which conflicts with the Complainant’s registered trademark STARFALL: See Pancil LLC v. Wan-Fu China Ltd, WIPO Case No. D2007-0190 (April 5, 2007).

The Respondent has not filed a Response to the Complaint or answered the Complainant’s factual assertions or evidence in any other manner.

On its own initiative, the Panel accessed the website using the disputed domain name. (This practice has been adopted by numerous panels: see Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. Sallen, WIPO Case No. D2000-0461 (July 17, 2000); Commonwealth Hotels Inc. v. CCD Internet, Case No. AF-00771 (May 17, 2001); Link Clicks Inc. v. John Zuccarini, WIPO Case No. D2000-1547 (January 12, 2001); and The Vanguard Group, Inc. v. Lorna Kang, WIPO Case No. D2002-1064 (January 20, 2003).) The “sponsored” links on the website appear to be provided by a commercial Internet advertising service.

The Panel notes nine recent decisions involving the Respondent: See Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0703000934715 (April 24, 2007); Corbis Corporation v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2006-1294 (April 1, 2007); Edmunds.com Inc. v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2007-0339 (May 9, 2007); Confédération Nationale du Crédit Mutuel v. Wan-Fu China Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2006-1635 (February 20, 2007); Shaw Industries Group Inc., Columbia Insurance Company v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2007-0282 (April 27, 2007); Sico Incorporated v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0701000886447 (February 23, 2007); Popular Enterprises, LLC. v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0701000892424 (March 1, 2007); WeddingChannel.com v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0702000913762 (March 16, 2007); and Morgan Stanley v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0702000924567 (April 13, 2007).

5. Parties’ Contentions

A. Complainant

The Complainant contends as follows:

(i) The Complainant is the owner of the PUMAROSA trademark registered in various countries, and the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark.

(ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name.

(iii) The Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith because it is generating revenue by using the disputed domain name to intentionally divert Internet users seeking the Complainant’s website to websites that provide commercial advertising. The Respondent is engaged in typosquatting.

B. Respondent

The Respondent has not filed a Response to the Complaint or answered the Complainant’s contentions in any other manner.

6. Discussion and Findings

The Policy is narrow in scope. It applies only to disputes involving alleged bad faith registration and use of domain names – conduct commonly known as “cybersquatting” or “cyberpiracy”. The Policy does not apply to other kinds of disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. The narrow scope of the Policy reflects its origin as a novel form of Internet dispute resolution designed to balance a wide range of perspectives regarding the regulation of Internet conduct.

The application of the Policy is limited to situations in which a complainant asserts and proves the following requirements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a): (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. The burden is on a complainant to prove all three required elements in order to be entitled to relief under the Policy. It is not sufficient for a complainant to make assertions without providing proof.

(i) The Respondent’s Default

Rules paragraph 10(a) requires that the Panel ensure that each party is given a fair opportunity to present its case. Rules paragraph 14 reads as follows:

Default

(a) In the event that a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any of the time periods established by these Rules or the Panel, the Panel shall proceed to a decision on the complaint.

(b) If a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any provision of, or requirement under, these Rules or any request from the Panel, the Panel shall draw such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate.

The Respondent was given notice of this proceeding in accordance with the Rules. The Center discharged its responsibility under Rules paragraph 2(a) to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to the Respondent of the Complaint.

In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Respondent has been given a fair opportunity to answer the Complaint, and the Panel will proceed to a decision.

The Respondent’s default does not automatically result in a decision in favor of the Complainant. The Complainant must still prove each of the three elements required by Policy paragraph 4(a). Rules paragraph 15(a) provides that the Panel shall decide the Complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, the Rules, and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable. In accordance with Rules paragraph 14(b), the Panel may draw such inferences as are appropriate from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complainant’s assertions and evidence or to otherwise contest the Complaint. In the circumstances, the Panel’s decision is based upon the Complainant’s assertions and evidence and inferences drawn from the Respondent’s failure to reply, as set forth in this decision.

(ii) Identical or Confusingly Similar

The Complainant is the owner of the trademark PUMAROSA registered in various countries for use in association with education and training services, and uses that mark in association with its business operated through the website using the domain name <pumarosa.com>. The Complainant’s assertions in this regard are supported by documentary evidence. The Respondent has not filed a reply to the Complaint or contested the Complainant’s assertions. In the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the trademark PUMAROSA.

The Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark was registered in Canada before the Respondent registered the disputed domain name.

The Policy requires that the disputed domain name be “identical or confusingly similar” to the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark. Neither the Policy nor the Rules provide any guidance with respect to the test to be applied regarding the confusing similarity requirement of the Policy. Nevertheless, the consensus reflected in the decisions is that the appropriate test for confusing similarity is a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the complainant’s trademark. See, WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, section 1.1.

The literal comparison approach is supported by a number of considerations:

1. The language of Policy paragraph 4(a) should be interpreted in a purposive manner consistent with the Policy’s remedial nature and objective – to prevent the extortionate behavior known as “cybersquatting”.

2. A literal comparison is consistent with a common purpose of domain names – to indicate the nature and content of the websites to which they resolve.

3. The language of Policy paragraph 4(a) does not invoke a likelihood of confusion test, as contrasted with Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv) which expressly refers to a “likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the registrant’s] website or location or of a product or service on [the registrant’s] website or location” as an indication of bad faith domain name registration and use.

4. The Policy is international and, in the absence of express language, it is inappropriate to import into Policy paragraph 4(a) a test that may not exist under all national trademark laws.

5. The procedure contemplated by the Policy is not well suited to the kinds of factual issues presented by a conventional source confusion analysis. In particular, the Policy is intended to be a relatively quick and inexpensive process, panels must make factual determinations based upon written submissions and documentary evidence, complainants have no right of reply without the panel’s permission, and parties are often not represented by counsel.

For those reasons, the Panel considers the appropriate test for confusing similarity to be a literal comparison of the disputed domain name and the complainant’s mark.

The disputed domain name and the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark are visually and phonetically similar. The differences between the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark and the disputed domain name are the “.com” suffix and the addition of a second letter “r”. We will consider each difference separately.

The “.com” suffix is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether a challenged domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. Rather, one looks to the second level domain for such a determination, since the “.com” suffix is merely descriptive of the registry services. See Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. (This Domain is For Sale) Joshuathan Investments, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0787 (October 8, 2002); The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Karpachev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571 (January 15, 2001); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Harold Brown II, and Ted Waitt, WIPO Case No. D2001-0716 (July 18, 2001); and The Chancellor, Masers and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. DR Seagle t/a Mr. Oxford-University, WIPO Case No. D2001-0746 (August 14, 2001).

Many panels have held that domain names based on a misspelling of pre-existing trademarks, including the addition of a single letter, are confusingly similar to the trademarks they incorporate. For example, see Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft v New York TV Tickets Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-1314 (February 12, 2002); The Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. v. NSDAQ.COM, NASDQ.COM and NASAQ.COM, WIPO Case No. D2001-1492; Wachovia Corporation v. Carrington, WIPO Case No. D2002-0775 (October 2, 2002); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Steven Newman a/k/a Jill Wasserstein a/k/a Pluto Newman, WIPO Case No. D2006-0517 (June 28, 2006); Doctor.Ing.h.c. F.Porsche AG v. Stonybrook Investments Limited, WIPO Case No. D2001-1095 (October 26, 2001); Red Bull GmbH v. Grey Design, WIPO Case No. D2001-1035 (October 24, 2001); Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Limited v. Macesic, WIPO Case No. D2000-1698 (January 25, 2001); Bang & Olufsen a/s v. Unasi Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0072 (September 7, 2005); EasyGroup IP Licensing Limited v. Sansone, WIPO Case No. D2004-0763 (November 16, 2004); Popular Enterprises, LLC. v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0701000892424 (March 1, 2007); WeddingChannel.com v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0702000913762 (March 16, 2007); and Pancil LLC v. Wan-Fu China Ltd, WIPO Case No. D2007-0190 (April 5, 2007).

The disputed domain name appears to be a purposeful misspelling of the PUMAROSA trademark by adding a second letter “r”. It appears that the Respondent is engaged in a practice known as “typosquatting” – where a domain name is a slight variation from a well-known mark in order to divert Internet traffic. This practice takes advantage of Internet users inadvertently typing an incorrect address when seeking to access the trademark owner’s website. Typosquatters often profit by selling advertisements and links to websites operated by the trademark owner’s competitors.

Some of the other decisions involving the Respondent also relate to the Respondent’s registration and use of domain names that reflected misspellings of pre-existing trademarks, such as <wweddingchannel.com>, <wnterprisecarsales.com>, <netsster.com>, <wwedmund.com>, and <starfalll.org>.

In light of the foregoing and in the absence of any explanation or rationale put forward by the Respondent for its registration and use of the disputed domain name, the Panel finds that the domain name was intended by the Respondent to be confusingly similar to the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied the first element required by the Policy.

(iii) Rights and Legitimate Interests

The second element required by Policy paragraph 4(a) – the registrant has no rights or legitimate interest in the domain name – requires the Complainant to prove a negative proposition, which can be particularly difficult.

The consensus reflected in the decisions is that the burden on a complainant regarding this element is necessarily light, because the nature of the registrant’s rights or interests, if any, in a domain name lies most directly within the registrant’s knowledge. As a practical matter, once the complainant makes a prima facie showing that the registrant does not have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name, the evidentiary burden shifts to the registrant to rebut the showing by providing evidence of its rights or interests in the domain name. See Packaging World Inc. v. Zynpak Packaging Products Inc., Case No. AF-0233 (July 28, 2000); Educational Testing Service v. TOEFL, WIPO Case No. D2000-0044 (March 16, 2000); Grove Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. TelesystemsCommunications Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-0158 (May 9, 2000); Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Commonwealth Hotels Inc. v. CCD Internet, Case No. AF-00771 (May 17, 2001); Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party, WIPO Case No. D2000-1415 (January 23, 2001); Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation v. Khaled Ali Soussi, WIPO Case No. D2000-0252 (July 5, 2000); Electronic Commerce Media Inc. v. Taos Mountain, Case No. FA0008000095344 (October 11, 2000); Universal City Studios Inc. v. G.A.B. Enterprises, WIPO Case No. D2000-0416 (June 29, 2000); Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532 (January 25, 2001); and Credit Suisse Group v. Milanes-Espinach, Fernando and Milanes-Espinach, SA, WIPO Case No. D2000-1376 (March 20, 2001).

The Complainant contends that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name because the Complainant has not authorized the Respondent’s use of the PUMAROSA trademark or any domain name incorporating or similar to the PUMAROSA trademark, the Respondent does not have any registrations or applications for registration of the PUMAROSA trademark, and the disputed domain name is not in any way identified with or related to any apparent business or other interest of the Respondent.

Except for the assertions in the signed and certified Complaint, the Complainant has not provided any evidence of trademark searches or other investigations to indicate that the Respondent does not have any interest in any marks that include the term “pumarrosa”. In some circumstances, the omission of such evidence would be fatal to a complaint under the Policy. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this dispute, including the apparent lack of legitimate connection or relationship between the disputed domain name and the Respondent’s name and business or the website for which the disputed domain name is used by the Respondent, the signed and certified Complaint together with an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to reply to the Complaint or provide any justification for its registration and use of the disputed domain name, are sufficient to satisfy the Complainant’s evidentiary burden.

Even though the Respondent has not filed a Response to the Complaint and has not contested the Complainant’s assertions, it is incumbent upon the Panel to consider whether the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name demonstrates rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. According to Policy paragraph 4(c), the following circumstances, if proved, demonstrate a registrant’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name:

(i) the registrant used or demonstrably prepared to use the domain name or a corresponding name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to notice of the dispute;

(ii) the registrant (as an individual, business, or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if it has not acquired trademark rights; or

(iii) the registrant is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the complainant’s mark.

To satisfy the requirements of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i), the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name must be in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. In some circumstances, a website providing links to search results or other websites might constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services. In the circumstances of this case, however, the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name is not bona fide within the meaning of Policy paragraph 4(c)(i) because: (a) the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s registered PUMAROSA trademark; (b) there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain name and the Respondent’s name or business; and (c) the Respondent does not use the domain name to advertise or sell its own wares and services, but merely to display “sponsored” links to websites operated by the Complainant’s competitors, which links are provided by a commercial Internet advertising service. See Wachovia Corporation v. Carrington, WIPO Case No. D2002-0775 (October 2, 2002); Adobe Systems Incorporated v. Domain OZ, WIPO Case No. D2000-0057 (March 22, 2000); Popular Enterprises, LLC. v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0701000892424 (March 1, 2007); and WeddingChannel.com v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0702000913762 (March 16, 2007).

In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(ii) is not applicable. The Respondent does not contend, and there is no evidence that, the Respondent has been commonly known by the disputed domain name or that the disputed domain name is derived from one of Respondent’s trademarks or trade names.

Policy paragraph 4(c)(iii) is not applicable. The Respondent is using the disputed domain name for a website that provides “sponsored” links to commercial websites provided by a commercial Internet advertising service.

For those reasons, the Panel finds that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

(iv) Registered and Used in Bad Faith

Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii) requires the Complainant to prove that the Respondent registered and has used the disputed domain name in bad faith. The language of Policy paragraph 4(b)(iii) is conjunctive and requires that both bad faith registration and bad faith use be proved.

“Bad faith” within the meaning of the Policy is a term of art, and is not intended to apply to distasteful conduct that might constitute bad faith in the ordinary sense of the term. Policy paragraph 4(b) provides that each the following circumstances are deemed evidence that a registrant has registered and used a domain name in bad faith:

(i) circumstances indicating that the registrant has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of its documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) the registrant has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, the registrant has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website or other on-line location by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website or location or of a product or service on its website or location.

The Policy expressly states that those circumstances are non-exclusive.

Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv) applies if the Complainant establishes that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain. There is no direct evidence that the Respondent knew of the Complainant or its PUMAROSA trademark, or intended to use the disputed domain name to confuse and divert Internet users. Nevertheless, the Respondent’s knowledge and intention may be determined by common sense inferences from circumstantial evidence.

The Panel finds that the Respondent knew of the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark, and registered and is using the disputed domain name in order to confuse and divert Internet traffic to the Respondent’s website, based upon the following circumstances: (a) the Complainant’s registered PUMAROSA trademark is specific to the Complainant in connection with its online educational products and services; (b) there is no apparent connection or relationship between the disputed domain name and the Respondent or the website for which the Respondent uses the disputed domain name; (c) the Respondent does not use the domain name to sell its own wares and services, but merely to display “sponsored” links to websites operated by the Complainant’s competitors, which links are provided by a commercial Internet advertising service; (d) there is no other apparent legitimate justification for the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name for its website; and (e) the Respondent has not denied any knowledge of the Complainant or its PUMAROSA trademark.

In addition, the Panel draws an adverse inference from the Respondent’s failure to provide any explanation or rationale for its use of the disputed domain name.

The Panel also finds that the Respondent’s website result in commercial gain to the Respondent. It is well known that many websites generate substantial revenue by directing traffic to other websites and search results. Based upon the information apparent from the current “www.pumarrosa.com” website, and in the absence of any explanation by the Respondent, the Panel finds that the Respondent’s website generates revenue for the Respondent in that manner.

The practice of registering domain names based upon misspellings of well-known trademarks for the purpose of diverting users to an unrelated website that generates advertising revenue for the registrant has been described as “classic bad faith”. See Wachovia Corporation v. Peter Carrington, WIPO Case No. D2002-0775 (October 2, 2002), Amazon.com, Inc. v. Steven Newman a/k/a Jill Wasserstein a/k/a Pluto Newman, WIPO Case No. D2006-0517 (June 28, 2006); and Popular Enterprises, LLC. v. Wan-Fu China, Ltd., NAF Claim Number: FA0701000892424 (March 1, 2007).

In the circumstances, the Panel finds, pursuant to Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv), that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith to confuse and divert Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain.

In the circumstances, the Panel need not consider whether Policy paragraphs 4(b)(i), (ii) or (iii) are applicable, or whether there are other grounds for finding that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

7. Decision

The Complainant has established each of the three requirements set forth in Policy paragraph 4(a) for the disputed domain name – the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s PUMAROSA trademark, the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

The Panel therefore orders that the disputed domain name <pumarrosa.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

Bradley J. Freedman
Sole Panelist

Dated: May 31, 2007